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Abstract
It is immensely challenging to devise a voting system that guar-
antees both the correct reflection of the will of the voters and the
secrecy of the ballots, based solely on compelling, objective evidence.
In response to this challenge, various voting protocols have been pro-
posed, typically using cryptography, that seek to base the assurance
of accuracy on transparency and auditability. This approach is neatly
captured by the maxim “verify the election results, not the voting sys-
tem!”. Such protocols strive to achieve a new requirement, that of
voter-verifiability : voters are able to confirm that their vote is accu-
rately counted while maintaining ballot secrecy.
This paper describes the concept of voter-verifiability, and it out-
lines a particular voting protocol, the Preˆt a` Voter protocol, to achiev-
ing voter-verifiabilty. A new version of the protocol that exploits some
special features of the Paillier encryption algorithm is presented. This
gives a more elegant and robust implementation of Preˆt a` Voter than
previous versions. In particular, the fact that Paillier encryption allows
the secret key holder to recover the randomisation as well as the plain-
text, enables a simplified auditing of the ballot receipts and avoids the
need to provide Zero-Knowledge Proofs. The use of Verified Random
Functions is proposed as a way to prevent any manipulation under-
mining the secrecy requirements. Finally, a new construction of the
ballot forms used in the Preˆt a` Voter protocol is presented that allows
the ballot forms to carry full permutations of the candidates rather
than simple cyclic shifts of earlier, re-encryption mix versions of this
protocol.
∗This technical report is a revised and extended version of TR 965, to appear on the
Journal of Mathematical and Computer Modelling
†Newcastle University
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1 Introduction
The history of democracy is littered with instances of the outcome of elec-
tions being manipulated, see for example [17] for an excellent account of the
history of democracy and voting technologies in the US. The ancient Greeks
recognised that elections would be the target of human mendacity and de-
vised simple technologies to shift trust away from humans to mechanical
devices [16].
The increasing use of digital technology in elections often means that the
outcome is contingent on the correct behaviour of software. Such software
is typically complex and, by definition, easily altered. Even if we were
to suppose that it would be feasible to fully verify the correctness of such
software, it would still be extremely difficult to ensure that this verified
software is that actually running throughout the election.
Chaum, [7], that proposed the notion of anonymising mixes and sug-
gested their application to voting. Since then, crytographers have been
devising voting protocols (schemes) that use mathematics to guarantee ac-
curacy of the count and ballot secrecy. In particular, such schemes strive to
remove the dependence on the correct behaviour of the software and hard-
ware. Rivest has coined the term software independence, [28], to capture
this design goal.
Such schemes provide a novel property known as voter-verifiability: vot-
ers are able to confirm that their vote is accurately included in the tally
but are not able to demonstrate to another party how they voted. The key
to achieving this rather paradoxical sounding property is to provide voters
with a receipt at the time of casting their vote that encodes their vote cryp-
tographically. Showing the receipt to a third party proves nothing, but it
enables the voter, or perhaps proxies acting on her behalf, to verify that the
receipt is correctly input into the tabulation.
The tabulation, as we will see later, is performed in full view on a Web
Bulletin Board, (WBB), a secure, append-only, publicly visible web site. All
steps of the tabulation process are posted here and subsequently audited.
The audits are carefully designed so as to ensure that any corruption in
the processing of the votes will, with overwhelming probability, be detected.
More precisely, the probability of the corruption of p votes going undetected
falls off exponentially with p.
Preˆt a` Voter, [30, 9, 33] is a particularly voter-friendly example of a
voter-verifiable scheme. Various mechanisms serve to detect corruption in
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any phase of this process: encryption of the vote (more precisely, in the
case of Preˆt a` Voter, in the construction of the ballot forms), recording
and transmission of the encrypted ballot receipt and the decryption and
tabulation of the votes.
1.1 Contribution of This Paper
A earlier version of Preˆt a` Voter presented in [33] used ElGamal encryption,
[15], and re-encryption mixes. I will refer to this as Preˆt a` Voter’06. El-
Gamal is a randomising encryption algorithm. That is to say, every time a
given plaintext is encrypted, it outputs a distinct ciphertext. This opens up
the possibility of re-encrypting ciphertexts, i.e., the randomisation can be
changed to transform a given ciphertext into a new ciphertext with the same
plaintext. Without the secret keys, it is not possible to link the two cipher-
texts. This feature of randomising algorithms is exploited in re-encryption
mixes to provide anonymity: a server takes a batch of ciphertexts, e.g. en-
crypted ballots or emails, and transforms each by re-encryption and outputs
the resulting transformed ciphertexts in permuted order. This can be re-
peated by further servers to give defence in depth: as long as not all the
anonymity servers are compromised the anonymity is still preserved.
The use of re-encryption mixes, has several advantages, for example,
clean separation of mix and decryption phases and easier recovery in the
event of detection of errors during the audit phase. The devices performing
the mixes do not need to hold secret keys, so a faulty or corrupt device
is easily replaced. Furthermore, mixes can be rerun and fresh mix audits
performed in the event of significant corruption being detected. For that
matter, mixes and audits could be routinely re-run or run in parallel. The
algebraic structure of ElGamal encryption turns out, however, to result in
technical difficulties when used with Preˆt a` Voter.
Full details of the ElGamal and Paillier algorithms will be given in Sec-
tion 4, but we first explain the notion of an encryption algorithm satisying
a homomorphism between the group structures on the message space and
the ciphertext space. With public key algorithms, the message space M
and ciphertext space C typically carry a group structure. Furthermore, the
encryption and decryption mappings between the message space and the
ciphertext spaces often define homomorphisms between M and C.
A public key cryptographic algorithm is a five-tuple {M,C,K,E,D},
whereM is a set of possible messages, C a set of possible ciphertexts and K
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a set of key pairs (pk, sk). E is a set of encryption functions, i.e. mappings
from M to C: M → C and D a set of decryption mappings: C → M .
For each (pk, sk) ∈ K there exists an encryption epk : E and a decryption
dsk ∈ D such that:
∀(pk, sk) ∈ K, ∀x ∈M, dsk(epk(x)) = x
Suppose that the message spaceM forms a group with operation addition
(⊕) and the ciphertext space C forms a group with operation multiplication
(⊗). Then the algorithm is said to satisfy an (⊕,⊗) homomorphism between
M and C if:
∀a, b ∈M, epk(a⊕ b) = epk(a)⊗ epk(b)
In the case of ElGamal, for a given prime modulus p, the message space
is the multiplicative group Z∗q , where q is a large prime divisor of p − 1.
The ciphertext space is Z∗q × Z∗q , i.e. pairs of elements of Z∗q . M forms a
group with respect to multiplication in Z∗q . C forms a group with respect
to supermultiplication, denoted by ⊗∗ and defined by:
(y1, y2), (z1, z2) ∈ Z∗q × Z∗q , (y1, y2)⊗∗ (z1, z2) := (y1 ⊗ z1, y2 ⊗ z2)
ElGamal satisfies the following homomorphism:
∀(pk, sk) ∈ K, ∀x, y ∈M, epk(x⊗ y) = epk(x)⊗∗ epk(y)
Paillier encryption, [23], has a message space M = Z∗n and ciphertext
space C = Z∗n2 , where n is a so called RSA integer, i.e. product of two
large primes. If we take ⊗ to denote multiplication in Z∗n2 and ⊕ to denote
addition in Zn, then Paillier encryption defines a (⊕,⊗) homomorphism
between M and C. That is, the encryption of the sum of two terms equals
the product of the encryption of the two terms.
As will be seen later, the ballot receipts of Preˆt a` Voter take the form
of a pair comprising a plaintext term and an encrypted term. As a re-
sult, it is not possible to put these directly through an anonymising mix:
there is no natural way to transform the plaintext term in order to prevent
tracing through the mixes but preserving the meaning of the receipts. As
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a result, in Preˆt a` Voter ’06, a variant of ElGamal known as Exponential
ElGamal is used. This carries the plaintext as an exponent of the group
generator and so enjoys the same homomorphic structure as Paillier. Using
exponential ElGamal allows us to transform the Preˆt a` Voter receipts into
a pure ciphertext term that can be put through a re-encryption mix. The
disadvantage of exponential ElGamal is that we have to constrain the plain-
text space in order to render decryption tractable. If we left the plaintext
space unconstrained we would have to take discrete logarithms in order to
recover the plaintext. Taking discrete logarithms in the ElGamal group is,
by construction, assumed to be intractable.
Paillier naturally has the (⊗,⊕) homomorphic structure to allow the
ballot receipts to be transformed into a form suitable for re-encryption mixes
without the need to constrain the plaintext space. It is this fact that we
exploit in this paper.
Paillier also has the feature that it is possible, given a ciphertext and
with knowledge of the secret key, to recover the randomisation factor as
well as the plaintext. This is in contrast to ElGamal for which recovering
the randomisation would require the ability to extract discrete logarithms.
This feature of ElGamal is to make the auditing of ballot forms significantly
simpler. Auditing requires the plaintext of the “onion” to be revealed and
verified. Ordinarily, with a randomising algorithm, this necessitates the pro-
viding Zero-Knowledge Proofs of correct decryption. If the randomisation is
available however, the correctness of the decryption can be directly verified.
I also describe the use of Verified Random Functions, [35], to eliminate
the possibility that the devices responsible for generating random values
could undermine the secrecy by carefully selection of these values.
Finally, this paper presents a way to handle full permutations of the
candidate lists on the ballot forms is presented. In Preˆt a` Voter ’06, only
cyclic permutations of the candidate list were allowed. This is enough to
conceal the vote in the receipt if voting consists simply of choosing a single
candidate. Cyclic shifts are however less robust than full permutations: if
an adversary is able to alter some ballots without detection, they have a
systematic way to shift votes from a given candidate to another.
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2 Related Work
There is a large and rapidly growing literature on cryptographic voting
schemes. It is not appropriate to attempt to survey it all here. I will
just mention the most closely related literature, concentrating on schemes
designed for the supervised rather than remote context. A more complete
survey can be found in [5], and for anonymity mechanisms, mixes, etc., see
the anonymity bibliography, [2].
The first suggestion that cryptographic techniques could be applied to
voting systems appears to be Chaum’s 1981 paper on anonymising mixes,
[7]. Benaloh and Tunistra, [6], introduce the notion of receipt-freeness along
with a scheme using homomorphic tabulation that satisfies it. Later, Chaum
[8] and Neff [22] introduced schemes that could be regarded as more prac-
tical than previous schemes. The original Preˆt a` Voter scheme, [29] and
[30], was inspired by the Chaum scheme, replacing the visual cryptography
by the candidate permutation concept. The Preˆt a` Voter candidate permu-
tation concept reappears in Chaum’s new PunchScan scheme, [1], and in
Scantegrity, [3].
In their Scratch and Vote scheme, [4], Adida and Rivest use pre-printed
Preˆt a` Voter ballot forms with Paillier encryption, but for a different pur-
pose: to allow homomorphic tabulation. In homomorphic tabulation, the
homomorphic structure of the encryption is used to sum the votes under the
encryption and then decrypt the totals. This is in contrast to mix-based
schemes, like Preˆt a` Voter, that first decrypts the ballots and then sums the
results. Their scheme introduces some other innovations, in particular, the
use of scratch strips to cover audit information. This enables off-line audit-
ing of ballot forms, by removing the strip to reveal the audit information,
and provides a natural mechanism to invalidate audited forms for voting.
This paper uses an adaptation of this idea to the on-demand printing of
ballot forms.
A number of schemes have been proposed that strive to provide a degree
of voter-verifiability without the use of cryptography: Randell/Ryan, [26],
and Rivest’s ThreeBallot, [27]. These do not provide the same levels of
assurance as the cryptographic schemes and depend on quite strong trust
assumptions.
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3 Election System Requirements
There is no universal consensus as to voting system requirements and, in
any case, they will vary from application to application and according to
jurisdiction. Here I describe informally the commonly accepted requirements
of the vote capture and counting components of the system.
The primary goal of a voting system is accuracy or integrity : all legiti-
mately cast votes should be accurately included in the count. Furthermore,
accuracy should be demonstrable. Thus we will strive for verifiability and
transparency, i.e: we provide mechanisms that demonstrate that the count
is accurate. Several cryptographic schemes, including Preˆt a` Voter, provide
unconditional integrity. That is, they provide guarantees of integrity that
do not depend on computational assumptions. In other words, integrity is
guaranteed even against adversaries with unbounded computational power.
Typically however, the accuracy guarantees are statistical in nature: there
is a probability of corruption of votes going undetected, but this falls off
exponentially with the scale of the corruption.
We will also require that a voter’s choice will be kept secret, often termed
ballot secrecy or ballot privacy. This is to avoid threats of vote buying or
coercion. A related property is that of receipt freeness: there should be no
way for the voter to construct a proof to a third party as to how they voted.
In other words, even if the voter is prepared to cooperate fully with the
coercer, the coercer cannot be certain of the vote.
A still stronger property is that of coercion resistance: even if the coercer
is able to play an active part in the unfolding of the vote casting protocol,
possibly influencing choices in an adaptive fashion, he still cannot determine
how the voter actually cast her vote. Coercion resistance mainly comes into
play in the context of remote voting, where the coercer can observe and
influence certain steps of the protocol, but can also apply to supervised
voting. Note that the term receipt freeness is a little misleading: most
voter-verifiable schemes seek to provide receipt freeness but provide a kind
of receipt, albeit one in which the vote is concealed cryptographically.
A rather novel requirement, not feasible in conventional systems, is that
of voter-verifiability. Voters are able to confirm that their vote is accurately
included in the count and, if not, to prove this to a judge. At the same
time, the voter is not able to prove to a third party which way they actually
voted.
Throughout, we seek to minimise the need to trust any components of
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the scheme, whether software, hardware or human. Typically it will not
be possible to eliminate all dependency, but where some trust is needed we
strive to ensure that it is distributed, i.e., a significant collusion would be
required to undermine the property. If we arrange for potentially colluding
parties to be mutually antagonistic, we can ensure that the chance of such
collusions forming and going undetected is small.
Besides the above technical requirements, voting systems must also be
cost-efficient, easy for voters to use and sufficiently simple to gain a sufficient
degree of public understanding and trust. Discussion of these requirements
is outside the scope of this paper, but we remark that the Preˆt a` Voter
approach strives to be as conceptually simple and voter-friendly as possible.
4 Cryptographic Preliminaries
In this section I introduce some cryptographic primitives that will be used
later. For more detailed descriptions consult any book on modern cryptog-
raphy, e.g: Stinson [36]. I assume familiarity with the basics of number
theory.
4.1 Public key cryptography
In classical cryptography it was always, implicitly at least, assumed that in
order to communicate secretly, two parties would already have set up some
shared secret information, a key or codebook etc. In [13], Diffie and Hellman
broke with this assumption and proposed the possibility that strangers with
no prior shared secret, could over open channels establish a secure channel
of communication.
In classical ciphers, knowledge of the encryption key necessarily entailed
knowledge of the decryption key, and vice versa. In public key cryptography
the situation is entirely different: it is possible to devise algorithms such that
knowledge of the encryption key does not entail knowledge of the decryption
key. More precisely, deriving the decryption key from the encryption key is
thought to be intractable, being equivalent to solving a “hard” problem like
factoring large integers or taking discrete logarithms in a finite field.
Thus it becomes possible to publish a encryption key and keep the de-
cryption key secret. This allows anyone to encrypt a message but only the
holder of the secret key can decrypt it. In practice things are not quite so
8
simple: it is necessary to introduce some form of authentication so that, for
example you can be sure that a public key that is claimed to be associated
with Anne say, really is Anne′s, in the sense that Anne and only Anne
knows the corresponding secret key.
For the rest of this paper, {x}PK will denote the encryption of x with
the public key PK.
4.2 RSA Encryption
The first realisation of the public key concept to appear in the open literature
is that proposed by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman, [25]. The security of the
scheme rests on the assumed difficulty of factorising. Anne first identifies two
large prime numbers, p and q. By “large” here typically means of the order
of a hundred digits. Given that factorisation is hard, it might seem that it
would be hard to find large primes. However, efficient algorithms exist for
finding primes that do not involve factorising. Typically such algorithms do
not yield primes with certainty but with as high a probability as required 1.
Let n := p · q. Now Anne chooses an encryption exponent e such that
gcd(e, n) = 1, i.e., e must be co-prime to n. Now she finds d such that:
e · d = 1 (mod φ(n))
Where φ(n) is Euler’s totient function, in this case φ(n) = (p− 1) · (q −
1). This computation can be performed very efficiently using the extended
Euclidean algorithm. Now Anne can make n and e public whilst she keeps
d (and p, q and φ(n)) secret. Now Bob can encrypt a message m say, which
is suitably encoded as a number in Zn, the set of residue classes modulo n,
as:
c := me (mod n)
Anne can decrypt this by computing:
cd = me·d = m (mod n)
1A simple example of such an algorithm is based on Fermat’s Little Theorem: if p is
prime, then ∀a ∈ Z∗p , ap−1 = 1 (mod p). Thus, for a putative prime p, we choose a set
of a’s at random and check whether Fermat’s congruence holds for all of them. If it does
then we have, with high probability identified a prime p.
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To see why this works, note that, by construction, e · d = r ·φ(n) + 1 for
some r ∈ Z. So, by Euler’s generalisation of Fermat’s Little Theorem:
∀a ∈ Z∗n : aφ(n) = 1 (mod n)
Where Z∗n is the set of residue classes modulo n with multiplicative in-
verse, i.e., Z∗n = {a ∈ Zn|gcd(a, n) = 1}.
It follows that:
me·d = mφ(n)·r+1 = mφ(n)·r ·m1 = 1 ·m = m (mod n)
as required.
Computing exponents in a finite field can be done very efficiently using
repeated squaring and multiplication. Computing d from e is straightfor-
ward with the knowledge of the factorisation of n, and hence of φ(n). With-
out knowing the factorisation there is no known, efficient way to find d short
of essentially exhaustive search. No efficient algorithm is known to factorise
composite numbers that are the products of such large primes. Hence it is
believed that it is intractable to compute d given only n and e. As long as
Anne guards the secret value d, and the factorisation of n, she alone can
decrypt messages encrypted using her public key. Anyone knowing n and e
can encrypt messages for Anne.
4.3 ElGamal Encryption
RSA as described above is deterministic; encrypting a given plaintext twice
yields the same ciphertext. I now describe a couple of randomising algo-
rithms for which repeatedly encrypting a given plaintext will yield different
ciphertexts each time.
The first algorithm is due to ElGamal, [15]. Anne finds a large prime p
and a generator α of a large, prime subgroup G of Z∗p of order q, q|(p− 1).
(α is a generator of G if every element of G can be expressed as a power of
α). Anne chooses a random k from Zp and computes:
β := αk (mod p)
The public keys are p, α and β, k is kept secret. Encryption of m yields
a pair of terms computed thus:
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c := (y1, y2) := (αr,m · βr) (mod p)
where r is chosen at random from Zp. Anne, with the knowledge of k,
is able to decrypt as follows:
m = y2/yk1 (mod p)
The security of ElGamal rests on the presumed difficulty of taking dis-
crete logs in a finite field. I remarked earlier that taking exponents is per-
fectly tractable, but the inverse operation of taking discrete logs is believed
to be intractable. Thus, recovering the secret k exponent from knowledge
of p, α and β is thought to be intractable.
A randomising algorithm like ElGamal allows the possibility of re-encryption:
anyone who knows the public key can re-randomise a given ciphertext c =
(y1, y2) by taking c⊗ ε, where ε is an encryption of the identity 1 of ⊗ with
randomisation r′:
(y′1, y
′
2) := (y1, y2)⊗ ε = (αr · αr
′
, βr · βr′ · 1 ·m)
which gives:
(y′1, y
′
2) := (α
r+r′ , βr+r
′ ·m)
Clearly, this is equivalent to simply encryptingm with the randomisation
r+ r′ and decryption is performed exactly as before. We will see the utility
of re-encryption when we come to describe anonymising mixes. Note that,
crucially, the device performing the re-encryption does not use any secret
keys and at no point in the re-encryption process is the plaintext revealed.
To obtain exponential ElGamal, we encrypt αm rather than m:
c := (y1, y2) := (αr, αm · βr) (mod p)
Exponential ElGamal has the same homomorphic structure as Paillier,
but its use means that the choice of plaintexts must be restricted to avoid
having to take discrete logarithms in order to recover the plaintext.
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4.4 Paillier encryption
Paillier is another randomising algorithm that, due to its homomorphic prop-
erties, is very handy in voting applications, [23]. Key generation proceeds as
follows: firstly generate an RSA integer n = p · q with p and q large primes
and compute the Carmichael function of n: λ := lcm(p − 1, q − 1). Find
a generator g of Z∗n2 such that g = 1 (mod n). The public key, (n, g) is
published while λ forms the secret key.
The encryption of a message m ∈ Zn is computed as:
c = {(m, r)}PK = gmrn (mod n2)
Where r is a freshly generated random value drawn from Z∗n.
Decryption is given by:
m =
L(cλ (mod n2))
L(gλ (mod n2))
(mod n)
Where, for convenience, we have defined L(x) := (x− 1)/n.
I won’t go into exactly why this rather surprising formula works. The
key ingredient is that fact that:
∀a ∈ Z∗n2 : an·λ(n) = 1 (mod n2)
Judicious use of the binomial theorem to expand g, expressed as 1+k ·n,
and noting that terms with n2 or higher order in n vanish taken modulo n2,
serves to move the plaintext m term from the exponent to a linear term.
Re-encryption of a ciphertext c is accomplished simply by choosing a
fresh random value s ∈ Zn and computing:
c′ := c · sn = gm · (s · r)n (mod n2)
Due to the way that the plaintext is carried in the exponent, the Paillier
algorithm enjoys the homomorphic property:
∀a, b ∈M, {a}PK ⊗ {b}PK = {a⊕ b}PK
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4.5 Threshold Cryptography
It is often important not to have to depend on a single entity to perform
cryptographic operations, such as encryption, decryption, signing, etc. This
prompts the development of techniques and algorithms to distribute the
knowledge of the secret key amongst a set of entities Φ in such a way that
only a quorum of Φ can perform the operation. Such primitives are typically
based on Shamir’s secret sharing scheme, [34]. An (m, k) threshold scheme
for example allows k or more entities from a set of size m, (k < m), to
collaborate to perform the operation. Any smaller set of size < k will be
unable to perform the operation. Furthermore, any set of shareholders of
size < k will be able to obtain any information about the secret key. Details
of how to generate a threshold version of Paillier can be found in [11].
4.6 Zero-knowledge proofs
An interactive zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) is a protocol in which one party,
the prover P , demonstrates the truth of a claim to the verifier V , without
V learning anything other than the truth of the statement. Such protocols
typically involve the prover first making a commitment, the verifier respond-
ing with a challenge and the prover responding to this in a way that can be
checked by the verifier.
An example of such a protocol is the Chaum-Pedersen protocol, [10] that
is designed to prove plaintext equivalence of a pair of ElGamal encryptions
without revealing the plaintext, the secret key or the re-randomising factor.
The proof is reducible to showing that a tuple (α, β,w, u) is a so-called
Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) tuple (α, αk, αx, αk·x), i.e., ∃ x and k such
that w = αx, u = αx·k and β = αk. Here, k is thought of as the secret
ElGamal key and x the re-encryption factor. Where the prover P is a mix
server demonstrating plaintext equivalence, P will know the re-encryption
factor x but not the decryption key k.
The three step protocol follows the standard pattern for ZK proofs: P
generates some fresh randomness, s, that serves to blind the secret and
makes a commitment. V responds with a random challenge, c, to which P
should only be able to respond with the value t = s+ c · x verifiable by V ,
if he really knows the secret value x.
1. s ∈ Z∗q : P → V : (a, b) = (αs, βs)
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2. c ∈ Z∗q : V → P : c
3. P → V : t = s+ c · x
Now V can check:
αt = a · wc and βt = b · uc
Informally, we see that the secret, random factor s chosen by P serves
to conceal the secret value x from V . If P does not know x, or indeed, the
claimed equivalence is false and such an x does not exist, it will be virtually
impossible for him, aside from an absurdly unlikely lucky guess, to respond
to v’s challenge value c with a value t that will pass V ’s checks.
A variant of this protocol can be used to demonstrate the correctness of
a claimed decryption of a given ElGamal ciphertext. Again, the proof can
be reduced to the proof of a DDH tuple. In this case, P knows k but not
the randomising factor x so we simply interchange their role in the protocol.
Suppose that we have the ElGamal ciphertext (y1, y2) = (αk,m · βk) and
P claims that this decrypts to m′. To check that m = m′ we require P to
prove that the tuple (α, β, y1, y2/m′) is a DDH tuple, which it will be iff
m = m′.
A similar protocol to prove correct decryption of a Paillier ciphertext can
be found at [11] in the case in which the prover knows the randomisation.
For Paillier it turns out that knowledge of the secret key allows the prover
to recover the randomisation as well as the plaintext. Thus there is no need
for a separate protocol for the case in which the prover is ignorant of the
randomisation. This is in contrast to ElGamal, where knowledge of the
secret key does not help recovering the randomisation.
4.7 Digital Signatures
These are the digital analogue of conventional signatures. Anne can digi-
tally sign a text M by computing a publicly agreed crypto hash of M and
encrypting this under her private key. This encrypted hash is appended to
the text M :
SigA(M) :=M, {Hash(M)}SKA
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Figure 1: Preˆt a` Voter ballot form
If Bob knows Anne’s public key, he can verify the signature as follows:
he applies Anne’s public key to the encrypted term and applies the hash
function to the plaintextM term. If the outcome of these two computations
agree, he may be confident that the text M was indeed signed by Anne and
has not been altered. This assumes that Anne’s private key has not been
compromised.
5 Outline of Preˆt a` Voter
Here I recall the key ingredients of the Preˆt a` Voter scheme. The key inno-
vation of the Preˆt a` Voter approach is, to encode the vote in a randomised
frame of reference, i.e., a randomised candidate list. As a consequence, the
voter’s choice does not need to be encrypted and so, in contrast to other
cryptographic schemes, there is no need for the voter’s choice to be commu-
nicated to an encryption device. Thus, the device does not learn the voter’s
selection and so the threat of this information being leaked via side channels
and subliminal channels is neatly sidestepped. Another useful spin-off of the
Preˆt a` Voter ballots is that the randomisation of the candidates serves to
eliminate any bias that may occur with a fixed ordering. The Electoral
Reform Society in the UK has recommended varying the candidate order
precisely to achieve fairness.
Suppose that our voter is called Anne. At the polling station, Anne
pre-registers and is assigned (or chooses) at random a ballot form sealed in
an envelope, an example of such a form is shown in Figure 1.
In the booth, Anne extracts her ballot form from the envelop and makes
her selection in the usual way by placing a cross in the right hand column
against the candidate of choice, or, in the case of a Single Transferable Vote
(STV) system for example, she marks her ranking against the candidates.
Once her selection has been made, she separates the left and right hand strips
15
X7rJ94K
Figure 2: Preˆt a` Voter ballot receipt
along a thoughtfully provided perforation and discards the left hand strip.
She is left with the right hand strip which now constitutes her (encrypted)
receipt, as shown in Figure 2.
Anne now exits the booth clutching her receipt, re-registers with an
official and casts her protected receipt in the presence of the official. Her
receipt is placed over an optical reader or similar device that records the
random value at the bottom of the strip and an index value indicating the
cell into which the X was marked. A digitally signed copy of the receipt is
also created at this point and passed to Anne as her receipt. The original
paper receipt is cast in a ballot box.
The fact that Anne gets a photocopy of her receipt rather than the orig-
inal is useful in that it makes the use of decoy LH strips (showing alterative
candidate orders) to counter coercion threats, [32] particularly effective. If
Anne retains the original, it may be possible to tell that perforation marks
on the decoy do not match up with the receipt.
The randomisation of the candidate list on each ballot form ensures that
the receipt does not reveal the way the vote was cast, so ensuring the secrecy
of the vote.
5.1 Construction of the Ballot Forms
The value printed on the bottom of the receipt, the so-called “onion”, is the
key to extraction of the vote. Buried cryptographically in this value is the
information needed to reconstruct the candidate order and so interpret the
vote value encoded on the receipt. This information is encrypted using a
threshold scheme. The corresponding secret keys are shared by a number of
tellers. Thus, only a threshold set of the tellers acting in concert are able to
reconstruct the candidate order and so interpret the vote value encoded on
the receipt.
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Each form has a unique, random, secret seed value ρ drawn from some
seed space S. The candidate permutation, pi, is computed from this seed
using a publicly agreed function σ:S → ΠC , where ΠC is the set of permu-
tations on the candidate set C. Each ballot form can be thought of as a
tuple:
(pi, {ρ}PKT )
where PKT is the threshold public key of the tellers and pi is the can-
didate permutation. The ballot is well-formed iff pi = σ(ρ). The value ρ is
kept secret. A receipt has the form:
(ι, {ρ}PKT )
where ι is the index value indicating the cell in which the voter placed
their X or a vector carrying rankings, approvals etc depending on the elec-
tion system.
With preprinted forms, it is possible to audit a randomly selected pro-
portion of the forms, using for example the Adida/Rivest off-line auditing
mechanism, [4]. Audit information, which can take the form of seed and
randomisation values or seed value plus zero-knowledge proofs of correct
decryption of the onions, is printed on the ballot forms but concealed with
a scratch strip. To audit a form, the strip is removed, revealing the audit
information and invalidating the form for voting. Such auditing can be per-
formed before and during the election period. The voters may be invited to
choose random forms for audit. For on-demand ballot forms we will need
alternative mechanisms that will be discussed later.
5.2 Anonymising Tabulation
Once the election has closed, the digitized copies of the receipts are trans-
mitted to a central tabulation server which posts them to a secure WBB.
This is an append-only, publicly visible facility. Only the tabulation server,
and later the tellers, can write to this and, once written, anything posted to
it will remain unchanged. Voters can visit this WBB and confirm that their
receipt appears correctly. If their receipt does not appear, or appears incor-
rectly (i.e., with the X in the wrong position) they can appeal to designated
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authorities. Note that, since they hold physical receipts, voters have sound
grounds for complaint if their receipt fails to appear on the WBB.
After a suitable period, assuming that any objections to the posted re-
ceipts have been suitably resolved, the mix tellers take over and perform
an anonymising mix on the batch of posted receipts. The first mix teller
takes the batch of ballot terms, re-encrypts each term and posts the result-
ing terms in a secretly shuffled order in the next column. The next mix
teller takes the output of the first and performs a second mix and posts the
resulting re-encrypted, shuffled terms to the next column of the WBB. We
perform as many such mixes as required.
After a suitable number of re-encryption mixes, the decryption tellers,
who hold shares of the secret key corresponding to the public key under
which the seeds were encrypted, take over and extract the votes. Before the
decryption starts though, an audit is performed on the mixes to ensure that
all the mixes have been performed correctly.
If the audits are satisfactory, we can safely proceed to the decryption
phase. Again, all intermediate steps of the decryptions are posted to the
WBB to allow subsequent auditing. No further shuffling is required at this
stage.
Various auditing mechanisms serve to detect and deter any corruption
in the construction of the ballot forms and in the operation of the tellers
during the anonymising and tabulation phases. I do not detail these here
as we will be introducing somewhat modified mechanisms tailored to this
version of the scheme later in the paper.
6 Preˆt a` Voter with Paillier Encryption
In this section I describe how the Preˆt a` Voter scheme outlined above can
be implemented with the Paillier algorithm.
6.1 Generation of Preˆt a` Voter Ballot Forms
In this section I present a mechanism to generate the forms ab initio, in-
cluding the seed values. In the next section I will describe a distributed
construction of encrypted ballot forms. I will assume that the public key
of the tellers, PKT = (n, g), is suitably certified and publicised and that
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there is a publicly agreed function, σ, from the seed space into the set of
permutations of the candidates. Each booth device creates a public key pair
PKb, SKb and publishes PKb.
Anne is now given a form at random that carries only a unique, random
serial number ξ. These serial numbers should be generated in some verifiable
fashion, ideally before the booth keys are generated and published. This is
to avoid attacks in which seed values are generated and encrypted under
the public key of the booth to give back the serial number. It seems that a
simple sequential serial number should be adequate.
When Anne enters the booth, she feeds this form into a device that reads
the serial number. It applies its secret, signing key SKb to ξ to generate a
random string η from which the seed and the randomisation will be derived.
The seed value ρ might be derived from the first half of the bits of η and
the randomisation ζ from the last half for example.
The booth device now computes the candidate order pi. It also computes
the onion value θ by encrypting the seed value, ρ, with the teller key PKT
using the randomisation ζ.
It prints the candidates on the LH column of the form in the appropriate
order. On the RH strip it prints the onion value to give a conventional Preˆt
a` Voter form. To facilitate auditing, should the form be selected for audit,
the device prints audit information on the LH portion of the ballot form.
I will discuss this in more detail later, for the moment I simply denote the
audit information by Λ. For a form used for voting, this information will be
discarded along with the candidate order, but it will be preserved on a form
destined for audit.
Thus, the seed and randomisation are computed from:
< ρ; ζ >:= {ξ}SKb
the candidate order as:
pi := σ(ρ)
and finally the onion value:
θ := {ρ, ζ}PKT
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ξFigure 3: Proto-ballot form with serial number
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Figure 4: Decrypted Preˆt a` Voter ballot form showing the candidate order,
the onion and audit information
The figures illustrate this: Figure 3 shows a typical proto-ballot form
bearing only a serial number. Figure 4 shows the form after the booth
device has computed and printed the candidates and audit information Λ
on the LH side, and the onion value at the bottom of the RH side. Finally
the device should print a digital signature, Σ1 over all the information on
the form on the bottom LH portion.
The generation of the seed and randomisation as deterministic functions
of the serial number serves to counter subliminal and kleptographic attacks
in which the device leaks information over subliminal channels by careful
selection of the seed or randomisation values, [21]. Thus, for example, a
malicious device responsible for generating seeds might collude with a third
party as follows: they agree some keyed hash function and the device now
carefully chooses seed values in such a way as to ensure that the hash func-
tion applied to the onion reveals information about the candidate ordering.
An alternative approach is to use the Verifiable Random Functions of
Micali et al, [35]. These are functions f that allow the holder of the secret
key to compute the random output, v := f(x) for any given input x, and
provide a proof that v is the correct output at x. The proofs provided at
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given inputs provably do not compromise the unpredictability of the function
evaluated at other points.
Note that essentially the same construction could be used to create pre-
printed ballot forms. Here however, we would use the Adida/Rivest con-
struction to enable off-line auditing rather than printing the audit informa-
tion on the LH portion of the forms.
6.2 Distributed Generation of Paillier Encrypted Ballot Forms
The disadvantage of the approach above is that the ballot generation device
necessarily learns the cryptographic variables and, in particular, association
of the candidate order and onion value. We could implement these devices
in such a way as to ensure that all information is erased once the form is
printed. However, guaranteeing this may be difficult and, furthermore, there
will be dangers of the information being leaked over side-channels. The more
elaborate construction of this section seeks to address these issues.
The ballot forms will be generated by a set of l clerks in such a way that
each contributes to the cryptographic values from which the candidate list
is derived. Furthermore, these values remain encrypted throughout. As a
result, all the clerks would have to collude to determine the seed values.
As before, I assume a set of tabulation tellers who hold the key shares for
a threshold Paillier algorithm with public key PKT : (g, n). These tellers are
responsible for the final decryption stage after the anonymising re-encryption
mix phase. This public key is publicly certified and known to the Clerks and
is used in the construction of the encrypted ballot forms.
Suppose that the Booths have public keys PKBk . I provide the construc-
tion for a single booth key and I will denote the public key of the booth in
question as PKB = (q,m); we simply replicate the construction for other
booth keys. In practice we would probably assign the same keys to all the
booths in a given polling station. Suppose that we want to generate w
ballots for the booth(s) in question.
The jth clerk generates w sub-onion pairs:
{θTj,i; θBj,i}
Where:
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θTj,i := {sj,i, xj,i}PKT = gsj,i · (xj,i)n (mod n2)
and
θBj,i := {sj,i, yj,i}PKB = qsj,i · (yj,i)m (mod m2)
The first term is an encryption of the j, ith seed under the teller’s public
key. The second term is the encryption of the same seed value under the
booth’s public key. The randomisations x, y, used for these two encryptions
should be independent, with xji drawn from Z
∗
n and for fresh random values
yji drawn from Z
∗
m. Suppose that n < m. We restrict the s values to s < n/l.
This is to avoid wrap-around problems when we come to take the product
of the sub-onions to form the full-onions.
All of these sub-onions are posted to a WBB in cells of an l×w matrix
(l columns, w rows)-an onion pair in each cell. To audit these, independent
auditing entities choose, independently for each row, a randomly selected
subset of the cells in the row, say half. For these selected cells the clerks
reveal the s, x and y values. The auditors check that the encryptions match
the posted sub-onion values and that the two seed values are equal for each
selected onion pair. The auditors also check that all the s values satisfy
s < min(m,n).
Assuming that no evidence of cheating by the clerks is detected at this
stage, the “full” onions are formed by taking the product of the remaining,
un-audited pairs row-wise. This step is universally verifiable. Let Ai denote
the set of indices of the pairs selected for audit in the ith row. Then the
“full” onions for the i th row are computed as:
ΘTi :=
∏
j∈A¯i
θTj,i
ΘBi :=
∏
j∈A¯i
θBj,i
where A¯ denotes the complement of A in L, where L is the indexing set
for the set of clerks.
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This results in onions for which the seed value is given by:
si =
∑
j∈A¯
sj,i
and the randomisation by:
xi =
∏
j∈A¯
xj,i (mod n2)
yi =
∏
j∈A¯
yj,i (mod m2)
As the seed values, and hence the candidate orders, remain encrypted,
none of the clerks knows the final seed values and they would all have to
collude to determine them. These ballot forms can now be stored and dis-
tributed in this form, thus avoiding the chain of custody problems mentioned
above. Kleptographic channels are also avoided as no single entity is able
to choose the seed values in such a way as to leak information.
6.3 Pre-printed Ballot Forms
These onion pairs can now be used to generate conventional, pre-printed bal-
lot forms as follows. I introduce two further processes, PT and PL. Suppose
that we initially have a batch of forms that are blank aside from carrying
a unique index value drawn from I. PT takes this batch and for each form
it looks up the corresponding ΘTi , where i is the index on the form. It re-
encrypts this and prints the result, Θ′Ti , on the RH portion of form. It then
covers this with a scratch strip.
Once PT has finished a batch of these, they are shuffled and passed on to
a process PL that holds the secret booth key. PL might reside at the polling
stations for example to enable printing of the forms locally on the day of
voting. For a form carrying the jth index, PL looks up the appropriate ΘBj
on the WBB, decrypts this, computes the candidate order and prints the
candidates on the LH portion of the ballot form. The index value is removed
but the PL device should print another independent serial number on the
form for audit purposes. The link between these two indices is kept secret,
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unless audited. The resulting ballot forms are now individually sealed in
envelopes.
These forms can now be used in the usual Preˆt a` Voter fashion as de-
scribed in Section 5. The receipt onion is revealed at the time of casting in
the presence of officials and observers.
These ballot forms can be randomly audited before, during and after the
voting period. For forms selected for audit, PL is required to reveal the seed
and randomisation values. The candidate order and ΘBi are recomputed and
checked to agree with the order printed on the form and the value of ΘBi
posted to the WBB. Θ′Ti is revealed and PT is required to prove that this is
a re-encryption of the ΘTi posted to the WBB.
6.4 On-demand Decryption and Printing of Ballot Forms
The construction of the previous subsection allows for the printing of the
ballot forms ahead of time. This has certain attractions, for example it leads
to a simpler, more familiar procedure for the voters and avoids the need for
decryption and printing devices in the booths. The downside is that we
have to worry about chain of custody issues, both from an integrity and a
privacy point of view.
I now present a way to generate encrypted proto-ballots. These will carry
a receipt onion and a booth onion, but not the candidate order. Suppose
again that we have paper ballot forms that initially just carry index values
from I. The PT process functions exactly as above and passes a batch of forms
with Θ′T s printed on the RH portion of the form covered with a scratch strip
to PL. For a form carrying the jth index, PL looks up the appropriate ΘBj ,
re-encrypts this and prints the resulting value, Θ′Bj , on the LH portion of
the ballot in a non-human readable format, such as a 2D bar-code. The aim
is to avoid the possibility of officials or observers associating the value with
the voter. The index value is now removed from the ballot form.
Prior to, during and after the election, audits are performed on a ran-
domly selected subset of these proto-ballots. For the selected ballots, the
scratch strips are removed to reveal the onions and P1 and P2 are required
to prove the re-encryption link back to the onion pair on the WBB. Audited
forms are discarded.
The result is a batch of ballot forms each carrying only a pair of booth
and receipt onions covered with scratch strips. On pre-registration, Anne is
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given one of these at random (or perhaps a number if we want to introduce
a cut-and-choose element, see the next section) and she takes this to the
booth. She allows the booth device to read the LH onion. The device
decrypts this, computes the candidate and prints this on the ballot. The
rest of the casting process proceeds as before.
These constructions ensure that it would take a 3-way collusion, the
booth and PL and PT , to link the receipt onions to the candidate lists.
6.5 Cut-and-Choose
The mechanisms described above allow for the distributed generation of
ballot forms, just-in-time decryption of the candidate list and printing of the
ballot forms in the booth. This has clear advantages in terms of removing the
need to trust a single entity to keep the ballot form information secret and
avoids chain of custody issues. On the other hand, it means that we can no
longer use pre-auditing of pre-printed ballot forms to check the correctness
of the candidate order. Given that we want to avoid having to trust the
device in the booth, we must introduce alternative techniques to detect and
deter any corruption or malfunction in the creation of the ballot forms. For
this reason we introduce a cut-and-choose element into the protocol.
To this end, voters could be furnished with two or perhaps more en-
crypted ballot forms. For each of these, the booth device decrypts the
onion, computes the candidate order and prints this on the form. The voter
selects one at random to cast her vote: the others will be audited and dis-
carded. Care must be taken to avoid introducing dangers of double voting
or chain voting etc. Double voting is probably fairly easily countered by the
supervised casting of ballot receipts in the presence of officials who ensure
that only one form is cast and the voter’s name is marked as having voted.
Chain voting threats might be a little more delicate to counter: here a
malicious voter, Yves, secretes a decrypted ballot form and smuggles it out
of the polling station. Yves marks this form with the candidate of his choice
and passes it to another voter who is required to cast her vote using this
form. Yves can subsequently check whether the voter complied by checking
the WBB. Keeping a log of serial numbers issued to a voter, in the manner
of known counters to chain voting [20], would help here. Employing scratch
strips to conceal the receipt onion value will also help thwart chain voting
attacks. The receipt onion is only revealed at the time of casting the ballot
in the presence of officials.
25
An alternative approach is the double sided forms of [31] to provide a
mechanism to keep a clear account of the distribution of ballot forms. Here,
each side of a form carries an independent onion pair. The voter chooses
one side to vote, for which the candidate order is removed, the other is left
intact along with the candidate list for audit.
6.6 Auditing Paillier Ballot Forms
To check the correct construction of a ballot form selected for audit, the
auditor either needs to get hold of the seed and randomisation values in
order to reconstruct the candidate order and onion value, or will need to be
provided with a ZK proof of correct decryption of the onion.
In their Scratch and Vote scheme, [4], Adida/Rivest proposed that the
audit information be printed on the ballot forms in advance and concealed
by a scratch strip. The audit information comprises the seed value plus a
ZK proof of decryption. Here, I propose a variant of the Adida/Rivest off-
line auditing mechanism adapted to on-demand printing. The booth device
prints the audit information on the LH strip of the ballots. Furthermore,
we can avoid the need for ZK proofs to demonstrate correctness of the de-
cryption performed by the booth device.
If we use the on-demand generation of seeds and randomisation described
in Section 6.1, the booth device will have generated the randomisation and
so can reveal it for audit purposes. The auditor will then apply the booth
public key, PKb, to concatenation of the seed and randomisation to check
that this gives the serial number. It then recomputes the candidate order
and checks that this matches that printed on the form. Finally it recomputes
the onion value using the randomisation provided and checks this matches
the value on the form.
Alternatively, if we are using pre-prepared onions, the booth device can
extract the seed value but will not immediately know the randomisation.
However, Damg˚ard et al, [11], show that for Paillier, knowledge of the secret
key allows recovery of the randomisation. This rather remarkable fact about
Paillier encryption seems to be surprisingly little known. For completeness
I give the details below. The Damg˚ard et al paper actually gives the re-
sults for their generalisation of Paillier to modulo ns+1, but for simplicity of
presentation I give the result for Paillier’s original modulo n2 version of the
algorithm.
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Suppose that the decryption device P with knowledge of λ is given a
ciphertext c = gm · rn (mod n2). P recovers the plaintext m from which it
can compute g−m (mod n2). From this P can extract the randomisation
term: rn = c · g−m (mod n2). Now P needs to take the n’th root of this
term. It computes the value a such that a · λ+1 = 0 (mod n). From this,
the randomisation can be computed as:
(rn)
a·λ+1
n (mod n) = ra·λ+1 (mod n) = r (mod n)
Auditing the ballot forms could take place at several points in the pro-
cess. For pre-printed ballot forms, auditing would be performed before the
election as well as during and after. For on-demand printed forms, a first
check could be performed at the time of casting the receipt: official auditing
devices would be available at the registration desk. As we don’t want to
trust the official audit devices we can introduce voter helper organisations,
[5]: representatives of the various parties provide auditing devices at the
polling stations to enable further checks could be performed either just after
the voter exits the booth or just after casting their receipt. These inde-
pendent audit devices could also check the validity of the digital signatures
applied to the receipts at the time of casting. If receipts are posted immedi-
ately to the WBB, these helper organisations could also check the accurate
posting of a receipt on behalf of a voter.
Additionally, auditing of double sided ballot forms could take place on
information posted to the WBB. All the information on both sides of the
receipts would be posted. The voted and auditable sides should be posted to
separate regions of the WBB in such a way as to lose any association between
the two sides. The voted sides would be processed via the tabulation mixes
whilst the auditable sides are available to be verified by anyone. Note that,
in principle, anyone can write an auditing program: the algorithms are all
public and standard.
6.7 Anonymous Tabulation with Paillier Re-encryption Mixes
The receipts do not have the form of pure Paillier terms, rather they are
pairs: an index term (or vector) and a Paillier encrypted onion. With re-
encryption mixes, there is no natural way to transform the index terms
as they move through the mix. This is in contrast to the use of decryption
mixes, as used in [9]: at each stage of the mix a part of the seed is revealed as
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a layer of encryption is peeled off and this seed fragment is used to govern
the transformation of the index values. These transformations can be so
arranged as to undo the effect of the permutations of the candidate order
used in the construction of the ballot form, [9].
In [33], this problem was addressed by using simple cyclic shifts of the
candidate list. This allows us to absorb the index value into the onion by
using exponential ElGamal. For voting systems that require the voter to
select a single candidate, cyclic shifts are enough to ensure ballot privacy.
Even in this case, however, there remains the concern that if the adversary
has some way of altering receipts in an undetectable way, then he will have a
systematic way to shift votes from one candidate to another. It is preferable
therefore, even in the simple case of single candidate selection, to use full
permutations of the candidate list.
Here we present a way of handling full permutations without having to
multiply the number of onions per ballot form. The construction presented
here is fine for single candidate selection but not enough to deal with ranked
voting systems such as Single Transferable Vote systems. I will discuss this
in Section 8.
We suppose that there is a standard, publicly agreed ordering of the
candidates σ0 in, say, alphabetical order. The permutation of the candi-
dates shown on the ballot form, σ, is constructed as the product of two
components: a permutation φ on σ0 followed by a cyclic shift κ:
σ := κ ◦ φ(σ0)
κ : Zn, φ := f(ρ), ρ : Zn
Thus, the candidate order shown on the ballot will be obtained by first
permuting the standard ordering according to φ and then shifting cyclically
upwards by κ (mod ν). f is a publicly agreed function from Zn to the
space of permutations of the candidates. Aside from being a total function
and providing a reasonably flat distribution over the permutations, assuming
a flat distribution of the ρ values, no particular properties are required of
it. Indexing the permutations of the ν candidates by elements of Zν! and
taking the output of f to be the permutation indexed by ρ (mod ν!) would
be suitable.
The ballot form now carries two onions:
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Θc := {κ}PKT
Θp := {ρ}PKT
For each receipt, the index value, ι, is absorbed into the c onion as
follows:
{ι, (ακ · yn)} → (αι · ακ · yn) = (αι+κ · yn) (mod n2)
The c and p onion pairs are put through the anonymising mixes. For each
ballot, the pairing of the two onions is preserved through the mixes. Once
we have finished mixing, we decrypt the c onion and extract the “corrected”
index ι+κ. We now decrypt the p onion and compute φ. The ι+κ (mod ν)
element of φ(σ0) is the candidate selected by the voter.
This construction serves to conceal the index value of the original receipt,
so preventing the adversary partitioning the mix according to index values.
Note however that if we were using a ranking system, the cyclic shift would
not be enough to fully conceal the ranking of the original receipt.
7 Auditing the Mix Tellers
We need to confirm that the tabulation mix tellers perform all their actions
correctly, i.e., each column on the WBB is a re-encryption and permutation
of the previous column, without revealing the permutations. In other words,
the set of underlying plaintexts in each column is the same, but secretly
permuted. Numerous techniques have been proposed to achieve this. For
comprehensive descriptions of various techniques see [5] or [12].
The technique that I outline here, as it is both rather intuitive and
flexible, is that of randomised partial checking (RPC) [19]: half of the links
are randomly chosen to be revealed and verified. For selected links, the mix
server is required to reveal the re-randomisation factor to enable the link
to be verified. The choice of links, whilst essentially random, is carefully
constrained in such a way as to ensure, for each transformation there is a
50/50 chance of it being audited whilst, for pairs of mixes, no full link across
the two mixes is revealed. I omit a detailed description as this can be found
in [33].
29
It is possible to verify the correctness of the re-encryption for selected
links without revealing the re-encryption factors by using zero-knowledge
proofs of plaintext equivalence. It is not clear however that revealing the
re-encryption factors for audited links poses any threat, and so it is not clear
that there is any real benefit in incurring the extra cost of constructing such
ZK proofs. Indeed, if we are concerned to confirm that the mix tellers are
playing by the rules and using “genuine” entropy for the re-randomisation
factors, it might be useful to reveal the re-randomisation factors for the
audited links. We might for example require that the tellers compute the
re-randomisation factors as signatures on the mix terms, that can be verified
for audited links.
An alternative approach is to adapt Neff’s robust anonymising shuffle
techniques, [22], to Paillier encryption rather than ElGamal, for example
[24].
7.1 Auditing the Decryption tellers
Finally, we also need to confirm that all decryptions are performed correctly
in the final decryption phase of tabulation. Here we can be more direct and
can audit every decryption step as do not need to worry about anonymity
at this stage-anonymity is provided by the mix phase. Thus we need simply
check that each decrypted vote does indeed encrypt to the corresponding
term in the previous column. Damg˚ard et al, [11], provide ZK protocols to
prove the correctness of decryption shares which can then be combined to
yield the full decryption.
8 Handling Ranked and STV style elections
In Section 6.7 I showed how we can handle full permutations of the candidate
list using a single onion per ballot. In principle, this means that we can
handle more sophisticated voting systems, for example Single Transferable
Vote (STV) or ranked systems. In practice however, the encoding would
become very expensive and we would face the so-called Italian attack : the
coercer requires a voter to use a certain identifying pattern in his low order
rankings to in effect identify their ballot and to prove how he voted. Such
attacks can arise for any voting system that gives rise to a sufficiently large
set of possible voting choices to allow (probably) unique identifiers to be
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encoded for each voter. Such attacks are particularly virulent in verifiable
schemes where the decrypted votes are publicly visible on the bulletin board.
An alternative approach is to have one onion against each candidate,
encrypting the corresponding candidate code. For a single candidate selec-
tion, the ballot receipt would in effect simply be the onion value against
the chosen candidate. For a ranked or Single Transferable Vote style (STV)
system, the receipt would comprise a vector of onions. This feels rather
inelegant and inefficient in that it multiplies the number of onions required
but appears to be unavoidable. These matters are discussed in [37].
A rather neat way to counter the Italian attack with STV style ballots,
based on the use of multiple onions per ballot, is due to Heather [18]. The
key idea here is to introduce a form of lazy decryption: at each stage of the
STV counting, we only decrypt those onions required and re-encrypt them
for the next stage.
9 Assurance Arguments
In this section I outline the arguments to support the claim that the scheme
presented here provides strong guarantees of accuracy of the count along
with ballot privacy (indeed receipt freeness). A more detailed analysis of an
earlier version of Preˆt a` Voter from a systems perspective can be found in
[32]. Full, formal definitions and proofs are beyond the scope of this paper.
9.1 Assumptions
For the purposes of our analysis I will make the following assumptions:
• An accurate electoral register is maintained.
• Voters are suitably authenticated.
• Procedures are in place to prevent double voting.
• I assume that a secure Web Bulletin Board can be implemented in a
robust fashion.
• The cryptographic algorithms are sufficiently resistant to cryptanaly-
sis.
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9.2 Assurance of Accuracy
Recall that we are regarding accuracy as the requirement that all legiti-
mately cast votes are counted as intended. This is sometimes expressed as
three properties: cast as intended, collected as cast and counted as cast.
9.2.1 Cast as Intended
I will suppose for the moment that all voters input their votes as they intend,
i.e., I will put aside issues of coercion and undue influence but return to this
when I come on to discuss ballot privacy. I will also assume that the process
of marking the forms is sufficiently error-free.
In order to be confident that votes are cast as intended, we need to be
sure that ballot forms are correctly constructed, in that the candidate order
printed on the form is consistent with the seed buried in the onion. I have
described auditing algorithms that will detect if a ballot is malformed and it
is clear that if a ballot form is malformed, then the audit checks will detect
this. Put differently, there is no way for an adversary to construct a ballot
in such a way as to lead to an incorrect encoding (and hence to incorrect
decoding during tabulation) of the vote that would not be detected by an
audit of that form.
As we are auditing a random selection of ballots, there is the possibil-
ity that some malformed ballots may go unaudited and so undetected. I
need therefore to argue that the probability of any significant number of
malformed ballots going unaudited is small. In fact, this probability falls
off exponentially with the number of malformed ballots. The arguments
here are quite involved and the details depend on the particular version of
the scheme used, in particular, whether pre-printing vs on-demand printing
is used for example. It is clear however that we must audit a significant
proportion, probably at least 50% of the ballots, and that the selection of
ballots must be random and unpredictable.
With pre-printed forms we need to worry about chain of custody issues.
It is not enough to do a random audit of the forms before the election, we
must continue to randomly audit throughout the election in order to guard
against the possibility of corrupt ballot forms being injected at later stages.
Allowing the voters to choose ballots for audit appears to be the best way
to ensure that such selection is unpredictable and as close to the time of
use as possible. Careful chain-of-custody procedures and anti-counterfeiting
mechanisms would also be deployed.
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9.2.2 Collected as Cast
To ensure that votes are collected as cast, we allow voters and voter helper
organisations to check that receipts are correctly posted to the WBB. Po-
tentially this could be supplemented by other measures like the VEPAT
mechanism, in which a robust paper audit trail is maintained and made
available to auditing authorities to check against the WBB. This of course
requires that the integrity of the paper audit trail be ensured.
As with all voting systems, we need also to guard against ballot stuffing:
the injection (presumably by officials) of additional ballots into the tabu-
lation. A number of measures can be deployed to counter this: carefully
logging the number of votes legitimately cast. The fact that the casting of
votes is in the presence of observers makes this easier to enforce. Another
possibility is to post to the WBB the names of voters who cast votes.
9.2.3 Counted as Cast
To ensure that votes are counted as cast, we use re-encryption mixes along
with Randomised Partial Checking. Note that the seed values are drawn
from a large space and so with extremely high probability will be unique.
This assumes that at least one of the clerks generates genuinely random
seeds, but this can be checked during the audits. This means that the mix
tellers have no freedom in how they reveal links. Thus, if a mix teller tries to
alter the plaintext of a ballot and this link is chosen for audit, it cannot evade
detection. Consequently, as long as the audit selections are not predictable
by the mix tellers when they commit the mixes to the WBB, the probability
of the corruption of p ballots going undetected falls off as 1/2p.
In fact we can do better than this. The fact that we are using re-
encryption mixes has the advantage that we can run and audit several mixes
in an fully independent fashion. This is not possible with decryption mixes.
We could rerun a decryption mix but we cannot independently audit it as
this would lead to revealing a larger proportion of links. Thus, if we run u
mixes and use PRC auditing for all of them, the odds of the corruption of p
ballots going undetected would drop off as 1/2p·u.
Throughout, we have the issue of guaranteing that the audit selections
are not predictable by the entities processing the election. Furthermore,
these selections must be seen to be unpredictable. Various techniques have
been proposed to deal with this: using lottery style sources of entropy,
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using stock market figures, xoring bit strings committed to by a number of
independent organisations, using the Fiat Shamir heuristic, [14] etc.
9.3 Assurance of Ballot Privacy
For ballot secrecy and coercion-resistance we need firstly to establish that
the receipts reveal nothing about the voter’s choice. The fact that, without
a threshold set of the secret keys, a receipt alone does not reveal the vote
follows from the secrecy properties of Paillier. We also need to argue that
the adversary should not be able to link the candidate order to the receipt.
To this end, I have described mechanisms to prevent the voter leaving the
booth with the LH portion of the the receipt, or at least, to mask the real
LH portion with decoys.
I have described constructions designed to ensure that only a collusion
of several entities could compromise the link between the receipt onion and
the candidate order. With pre-printed ballot forms, we need to carefully
protect the secrecy of the ballot information prior to use.
It must be shown also that the anonymising mixes really ensure that it
is not possible to determine any links between input receipts and output
decrypted votes. Care needs to be taken to avoid threats like the ballot
doubling attack that can arise when using malleable crypto. Here, if the
adversary is able to inject receipts into the bulletin board and wants to
identify a particular voter’s choice, he can inject a receipt that is a re-
encryption of the voter’s receipt. This will result in two decrypted votes
emerging from the mixes with identical seed values. Measures to counter
ballot stuffing will also help counter this threat. A further counter-measure
is to perform plaintext equivalence tests on the batch of ballots before any
decryption is performed to weed out any onions with the same seed values.
A threat that is tricky to counter in Preˆt a` Voter and other voter-
verifiable schemes, are randomisation attacks. Here the coercer requires
that voter to produce a receipt that conforms to some specification. For
Preˆt a` Voter, this might be that the X be cast in the first cell for example.
This has the potential to nullify the voter’s choice. The main counter to
this is to allow the voters a choice of ballot forms to cast their vote.
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10 Conclusions and Future Work
Preˆt a` Voter provides a voter-friendly, high assurance voting scheme. Strong
guarantees of accuracy and ballot secrecy are based on cryptographic mech-
anisms and a high degree of transparency. Voters are able to confirm that
their receipts are accurately included in the tabulation. Minimal trust need
be placed in software, hardware, officials etc.
I have described several enhancements of Preˆt a` Voter’06 to use Paillier
encryption in place of exponential ElGamal. This retains the advantages
of Preˆt a` Voter’06 whilst leading to a more straightforward construction of
the ballot forms compatible with the re-encryption mixes at the tabulation
stage. The use of Paillier encryption removes the need to constrain the
seed values to a statistical distribution. The new construction also means
that, whereas previously a collusion of the last clerk plus booth device could
establish the onion/candidate list associations, now a collusion of the PT ,
PL processes and booth device would be required.
A number of other improvements have been incorporated, for example,
enabling the booth device to decrypt the booth onions, avoiding the need
to have the tellers on-line for auditing.
I have also provided a mechanism for the full generation of the ballot
forms in the booth, including the generation of the seeds. In order to avoid
the threat of kleptographic channels, the seeds and randomisations are gen-
erated deterministically as signatures or Verified Random Functions of the
ballot serial numbers.
A number of open questions and challenges remain. A more rigorous
modelling and analysis of the scheme, including variants, is required. Ideally,
this should not be only of the cryptographic core of the scheme but should
also include the surrounding system: the voters, officials, the procedures
etc. A more systematic way to identify threats and to evaluate the efficacy
of counter-measures is also required. Until such a framework is available it
is difficult to evaluate the various trade-offs that have been identified.
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